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LIMITATIONS IN CANADIAN LAW ON THE




It is trite law that the consent of the patient is a prerequisite to any medi-
cal intervention.' In the famous words of Cardozo, J., in Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital:2 "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body ... " However, there are certain situations in which the consent of
the patient is not required as, for example, in emergency situations or situa-
tions in which the patient does not have the mental capacity to give or with-
hold consent. In the latter situation, the consent of some surrogate is
required3 and in the former situation, no consent is required.4 Whether the
situation is an emergency or one in which the patient lacks the necessary
capacity is often a difficult factual question. However, the law on the matter
is relatively clear.
An uncertain area of the law concerns the right of prisoners to give or
withhold consent to medical treatment.5 Does a prisoner enjoy the same
right as any other person to give or withhold consent to medical treatment?
* B.Sc. (Toronto), LL.B. (Hons.) (Osgoode Hall), LL.M. (Toronto), Associate Profes-
sor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. This essay
was originally presented as a paper at the 7th World Congress on Medical Law, Ghent,
Belgium, August 18-22, 1985.
The citations in this article do not conform to the Harvard Uniform System of
Citations. Rather, they follow the author's instructions as to Canadian citation form.
1. Hopp v. Lepp, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 192, 112 D.L.R. (3d) 67, 13 C.C.L.T. 66; Reibl v.
Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880, 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 14 C.C.L.T. 1.
2. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.C.A. 1914). This statement by Cardozo, J., was referred to by
Laskin, C.J.C. in Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. at 890, 114 D.L.R. (3d) at 10.
3. Various persons may be authorized to give consent as, for example, a relative or
guardian, a doctor or a hospital director. See E. PICARD, LEGAL LIABILITY OF DOCTORS AND
HOSPITALS IN CANADA 61 (2d ed. 1984).
4. Marshall v. Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260, 60 C.C.C. 136 (N.S.S.C.).
5. On the various underlying policy issues and legal positions possible, see Somerville:
Refusal of Medical Treatment in "Captive Circumstances", 63 CAN. B. REV. 59 (1985); Zel-
lick: The Forcible Feeding of Prisoners: An Examination of the Legality of Enforced Therapy,
[1976] PUBLIC LAW 153.
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Text writers usually answer this question affirmatively.6 It is submitted,
however, that Canadian law on this point is unclear and, if anything, what
little law there is directly on point suggests the contrary.7 Two recent Cana-
dian cases-the 1983 decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in
Attorney-General of British Columbia v. Astaforoff8 and the 1984 decision of
the Quebec Superior Court in Attorney-General of Canada v. Notre Dame
Hospital; Niemic (third party) 9 -have not clarified this area of the law.'0
Indeed Niemic may have further complicated the situation by importing into
the analysis an inappropriate application of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. " The purpose of this essay is to examine the judgments in
Astaforoff and Niemic.
6. See, e.g., PICARD, supra note 3, at 63.
7. Leigh v. Gladstone, 26 T.L.R. 139 (K.B. 1909). American jurisprudence is fairly cer-
tain on the analysis to be used in such cases: the legitimate interests of the state's correctional
system are to be balanced against the constitutional rights of the prisoner refusing treatment.
The state interests identified are (1) deterrence of crime, (2) removing offenders from society
for a given period of time, (3) rehabilitation of offenders, and (4) maintaining internal prison
security. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). The constitutional rights of a
prisoner, while necessarily limited by the fact of imprisonment, are not totally abrogated. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). The constitutionally protected rights which
are of primary relevance in such cases are the right to privacy and the right to procedural due
process. However, while the analysis to be followed is fairly certain, the results of particular
cases are, it is submitted, as difficult to predict as in Canadian jurisprudence. For considera-
tions of the leading American cases, see Tagawa: Prisoner Hunger Strikes: Constitutional Pro-
tection for a Fundamental Right, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 569 (1983); Greenberg: Hunger
Striking Prisoners: The Constitutionality of Force-Feeding 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (1983);
Powell: Constitutional Law-Forced Feeding of a Prisoner on a Hunger Strike: A Violation of
an Inmate's Right to Pivacy, 6 N.C. L. REV. 714 (1983); Ansbacher: Force-Feeding Hunger-
Striking Prisoners: A Framework for Analysis, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 99 (1983); Bennett: The
Privacy and Procedural Due Process Rights of Hunger Striking Prisoners, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1157 (1983); Sunshine: Should a Hunger-Striking Prisoner Be Allowed to Die?, 24 B.C. L.
REV. 423 (1984).
8. 6 C.C.C.3d 503 (B.C.C.A.), af'g, 6 C.C.C.3d 498 (B.C.S.C. 1983)
9. (1984] C.S. 426, 8 C.R.R. 382 (Que. S.C.).
10. In Institut Philippe Pinel de Montr6al v. Dion, [1983] C.S. 438, 2 D.L.R. (4th) 234
(Que. S.C.), the Court was similarly faced with a patient who refused medical treatment.
However, Dion involved a patient whom the Court found was unable to give or refuse consent
because of psychiatric illness, Que. C.S. at 443, D.L.R.4th at 241. No question of competency
to give or withhold consent to medical treatment arose on the facts in either Astaforoff or
Niemic. This essay is concerned solely with the case of an adult prisoner who is competent to
consent to or refuse medical treatment.
11. The CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS is Part I of the CONSTITU-
TION ACT, 1982, which in turn is Schedule B to the CANADA ACT, 1982, U.K. 1982, c. 11.
The CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, together with the rest of the CONSTI-
TUTION ACT, 1982, was proclaimed in force by Her Majesty the Queen on April 17, 1982.
(Proclamation: Registration SI/82-97, May 12, 1982.)
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CANADIAN LAW PRIOR TO ASTAFOROFF and NIEMIC
The leading Anglo-Canadian case on the medical treatment of prisoners is
the 1909 decision of the English Court of King's Bench in Leigh v. Glad-
stone. 12 Mrs. Marie Leigh, the plaintiff, was a suffragette who had been con-
victed of disturbing a meeting and resisting the police. She was sentenced to
four months imprisonment with hard labour. Immediately upon entering
prison, she committed acts of indiscipline (such as breaking several window
panes) and refused to eat the food given to her. On the third day of her
imprisonment, the plaintiff was forcibly fed by the prison doctor. The plain-
tiff admitted that no more force than was necessary to feed her was used.
After two weeks of daily force feedings, either by mouth or nasally, the
plaintiff was sick after each feeding. After approximately a month of such
feedings, the plaintiff was very weak and could retain no food. After serving
slightly more than one month of her four month sentence, the plaintiff
brought action against the prison doctor who had fed her, the governor of
the prison, and the Home Secretary, claiming damages for assault.
The case was tried before a jury. In charging the jury, Lord Alverstone,
C.J., said that "it was wicked folly [for the plaintiff] to attempt to starve
[herself to death" and ruled:13
as a matter of law that it was the duty of the prison officials to
preserve the health of the prisoners, and afortiori to preserve their
lives. (emphasis provided)
The report of the case does not indicate any authority having been cited by
the Chief Justice in support of this ruling. In the result, after two minutes
deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
It is submitted that the ruling in Leigh v. Gladstone is wrong. The deci-
sion is clearly contrary to the fundamental principle that every sane adult
person has the right to determine what is done with his body. 4 One writer,
Graham Zellick, argued persuasively15 that Leigh v. Gladstone cannot be
justified either by reference to the common law rule against attempting sui-
cide 6 or on the basis of imprisonment alone. He summarized his position as
12. See supra note 7.
13. Id. at 142. The second passage reproduced was not made during the charge to the
jury. However, it is a quotation from the trial judge and is to the same effect as his words in
charging the jury, id., which were: "It was the duty... of the officials to preserve the health
and lives of the prisoners, who were in the custody of the Crown."
14. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
15. See Zellick, supra note 5.
16. In any event, attempting suicide ceased to be an offence in Canada in 1972, Can. Stat.
c. 13, § 16 (1972), which repealed section 225 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34
(1970). It is, however, an offence contrary to section 224 of the Code to counsel, procure, aid,
or abet a person to commit suicide.
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follows:,"
The duty laid down in Leigh v. Gladstone is open to question, both
as regards prisons and any more general application. The justifica-
tion by reference to the particular fact of imprisonment is far from
convincing. The perfunctory and uncritical acceptance of the deci-
sion by many commentators is surprising.
Leigh v. Gladstone has also been referred to as an example of the defence of
necessity. "8 However, it is submitted that this defence is inapplicable against
a person who has explicitly indicated that he does not wish to be "saved."
However, Leigh v. Gladstone has not yet been overruled.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA v. ASTAFOROFF
Mary Astaforofi was a 69 year old Sons of Freedom Doukhobor who had
been convicted of arson for the seventh time. She was sentenced to three
years imprisonment and became, therefore, the responsibility of the federal
prison system.' 9 However, under an agreement between the federal and
British Columbia governments, she was serving her sentence in a provincial
jail in British Columbia.2° She went on an intermittent hunger strike, de-
clining to eat for 208 days out of approximately a year and a half. She
recommenced her hunger strike and was in very poor health. Medical evi-
dence indicated that she might not have long to live if allowed to continue
refusing food. The medical evidence also indicated that she was rational and
fully aware of what she was doing. She informed prison officials that she did
not want any medical attention and that that request was to continue even if
she became incapable of making rational decisions or slipped into uncon-
sciousness. The Attorney-General of Canada brought a petition seeking an
order directing the British Columbia jail officials "to provide such medical
treatment as is deemed appropriate to preserve the life of . . .Mary As-
taforoff, although she does not consent to such treatment." '2'
At first instance, Bouck, J., in oral reasons, characterized the issue as
17. See Zellick, supra note 5, at 185.
18. In Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams, [1974] 1 Ch. 734, 746 (C.A.),
Edmund Davies, L.J., referred to Leigh v. Gladstone as follows: "As far as my reading goes, it
appears that all the cases where a plea of necessity has succeeded are cases which deal with an
urgent situation of imminent peril: for example, the forcible feeding of an obdurate suffragette,
as in Leigh v. Gladstone (1909), 26 T.L.R. 139, 142, where Lord Alverstone, C.J., spoke of
preserving the health and lives of the prisoners who were in the custody of the Crown;. ... "
19. Under Canadian law, persons sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years or
more become the responsibility of the federal penitentiary system.
20. The only federal penitentiary for women is at Kingston, Ontario, some 3500 kilome-
tres from Astaforofi's home province, British Columbia. Incarcerating her in a provincial jail
allowed her to remain in British Columbia.




As I see it, my responsibility is to decide whether, under the partic-
ular circumstances of this case, there is a legal duty cast upon the
province to force-feed the respondent against her will in order to
prevent her from committing suicide. If there is this duty, then
should I make the order compelling the prison officials to carry it
out?
Without reference to any authority23 and, in particular, without referring
to Leigh v. Gladstone, Bouck, J., held that "no law compels the provincial
officers to apply force to her against her will."' 24 He reasoned as follows: 25
What Mary Astaforoff is trying to do is commit suicide. The
law does not countenance suicide. While it is not a crime, the
Criminal Code says it is an offence to counsel or procure a person
to commit suicide, or aid or abet a person in the commission of
suicide: s. 224. But idly standing by without encouraging a person
to commit suicide is no crime. A mere spectator to a suicide can-
not be convicted of criminal offence.
None the less, it is the duty of every person to use reasonable
care in preventing a person from committing suicide. What is rea-
sonable depends upon the facts. For example, if a jail guard sees a
prisoner trying to hang himself in his cell, then it seems reasonable
he should take steps to prevent the inmate from taking his own life.
On the other hand, if a person climbs to the top of a bridge and
threatens to jump, the law does not impose a legal duty on anyone
to risk his own life by climbing the bridge in attempting to get the
person down. In that situation, it is reasonable if steps are taken to
encourage the jumper by shouts or other methods of communica-
tion not to jump ...
I am aware of the responsibility of the court to preserve the
sanctity of life. It is a moral as well as a legal duty. However, in
the circumstances of this case the facts are against the motion of
the Attorney-General of Canada. She has a long history of fasting.
Her health is very poor. There is the danger she might die by ap-
plying the procedure necessary to get nutrients into her stomach.
She is free to leave the prison, but she chooses to remain there and
22. Id. at 502.
23. Bouck, J., indicated that counsel had referred him to "a number of American authori-
ties discussing the principles involved," but there is no indication of whether he was referred to
Leigh v. Gladstone. He stated that "[b]ecause it is necessary to deal with the application right
now, I do not have the luxury of analyzing the law in as much detail as the arguments justify."
Astaforoff, 6 C.C.C.3d at 499.
24. Id. at 503.
25. Id. at 502-03.
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starve herself to death. Given these facts, I cannot find it is reason-
able that the Attorney-General for British Columbia and the
prison authorities under his direction should force-feed her in or-
der to prevent her suicide.
Bouck, J.'s, references to "the sanctity of life" and "the duty of every person
to use reasonable care in preventing a person from committing suicide" (em-
phasis provided) are reminiscent of Leigh v. Gladstone, and certainly consis-
tent therewith. However, there is some lessening of the extent of the duty:
reasonableness is the touchstone.
On appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the ruling at first
instance was affirmed. Taggart, J.A., for the Court, in reasons which were
once again oral, held that the Attorney-General of Canada had not suc-
ceeded in clearly establishing that the duty contended for existed and that,
therefore, the order sought would not be granted. Two important points
must be made. First, while Taggart, J.A., did not rule that the provincial
prison officials were under a duty to force feed Astaforoff, neither did he
hold that they were not under such a duty. He stated:26
[T]here is a discretion conferred on the court as to the making of
a declaratory order such as the one sought here. Before making
such an order, I think, one would wish to be as certain as one can
possibly be that there exists a duty. . . such as that contended for
by the Attorney-General of Canada. I think one would not make
the declaratory order sought unless there was clear authority for
making it. Such a declaration would have implications going far
beyond the circumstances of the case with which we are immedi-
ately concerned.
From the submissions which have been made to us by the parties
I am not satisfied that there is a clear case for the making of the
declaratory order sought by the Attorney-General of Canada.
Having said that, I hasten to add that I am not satisfied either that
such a duty does not exist. I say only that in the emergent circum-
stances in which this case comes before us, and having regard for
the necessity of giving a judgment as expeditiously as possible, I
am not satisfied that this is a case where the court should make the
declaration sought. (emphasis provided)
Thus, Taggart, J.A., specifically leaves open the possibility that Leigh v.
Gladstone may state the law: prison officials may be under a duty to treat.
Second, Taggart, J.A., drew a clear distinction between the question of
whether there was a duty on the prison officials to provide medical treatment
to a prisoner against his wishes and the question of whether there was a
26. Id. at 506.
Refusal of Treatment
power in the authorities to do so. He stated:27
I should emphasize that we are here concerned solely with the
existence of the duty contended for by the Attorney-General of
Canada. Put in the negative, we are not concerned with the power
of the corrections authorities, or indeed of any other prison author-
ities, to forcibly feed prisoners under their care and control. I em-
phasize again that we are not concerned with power, but rather
with the existence of a duty.
Therefore, even if prison officials are not under a duty to treat, they may
have the power to do so. From the prisoner's perspective, the distinction is
irrelevant: in either case, he would have no action against the officials for
treating him without his consent.
As in the Chambers judgment, the Court of Appeal referred to no author-
ity in its judgment and, in particular, did not refer to Leigh v. Gladstone.28
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF CANADA v NOTRE-DAME HOSPITAL, NIEMIc
(THIRD PARTY)
Jan Niemic, a citizen of Poland, had applied for permission to remain in
Canada as a refugee. The Minister of Employment and Immigration refused
to grant refugee status and ordered that Niemic be deported to Poland.
While in detention awaiting deportation, Niemic swallowed a steel wire coat
hanger which was approximately 20 centimeters long. He was taken to and
admitted to Notre-Dame Hospital in Montreal. Niemic refused to allow
doctors to treat him in any way, refusing all tests and examinations and
declining to eat almost anything. In view of Niemic's refusal to consent to
medical treatment, doctors at the hospital declined to treat him. He re-
mained, however, hospitalized. Medical evidence indicated that Niemic was
in grave danger; in particular, the wire might puncture his throat or stomach
at any time. The Attorney-General of Canada moved for an order directing
the hospital and the doctor to whom Niemic had been assigned to take all
measures necessary for the treatment of Niemic, including feeding him and
operating to remove the wire.29
27. Id at 505.
28. Mary Astaforoff, 72, was once again convicted of arson and was sentenced on October
3, 1985, in British Columbia County Court, to ten years imprisonment. See GLOBE &
MAIL(Toronto) A4 (nat'l Ed. Oct. 4, 1985). She commenced a hunger strike and died Novem-
ber 1985. See GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) A12 (nat'l Ed. Nov. 27, 1985).
29. I am grateful to Professor Julius H. Grey of the Faculty of Law, McGill University,
for providing me with copies of the Notice of Motion and supporting Affidavits in Niemic and
of the judgment therein as issued by the Court. Professor Grey appeared in the case as counsel
for Niemic. While a court order authorizing treatment of a prisoner without his consent
would clearly protect a doctor who provided such treatment from subsequent legal proceed-
1986]
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The Chambers judge, Barbeau, J.S.C., in the result authorized the hospital
and the doctor in charge of Niemic's care to take all steps necessary to treat
Niemic. Barbeau, J.S.C., reasoned as follows:30
The case at bar involves the unusual situation of an adult person
who is competent and able to make his intentions known, facing
the dilemma described above. He relies upon the inviolability of
his person and its corollary proposition, namely the right to with-
hold consent to medical acts capable of saving him from the ulti-
mate consequences foreseen.
In the opinion of the court the principle of the inviolability of
the individual is not absolute; the principle is in essence concerned
with the protection of the individual and the preservation of his
integrity and life. Respect for the life of a human being takes pre-
cedence over respect for his will, because to do so conforms with
the essential interest of the human being.
The laws of this country include countless provisions all aimed
at protecting life and the physical security of the individual. They
consider human life an intangible value; they punish with vigour
those who destroy or endanger it. While each human being is, in
principle, master of his destiny, his right to self-determination re-
mains subject to restrictions recognized by law.
Even though attempted suicide as defined in our law before 1972
ings, quaere the ethical, as opposed to legal, position of the doctor. In particular, would the
doctor be liable to professional disciplinary proceedings?
30. This is the author's translation. The original French of the judgment, as reported in
Niemic, Que. C.S. at 426-427, and 8 C.R.R. at 383-384, is as follows:
La pr6sente instance soulive le fait inusit6 de la personne adulte, capable d'agir et
de faire connaitre ses intentions, fae au dilemme susd6crit. I invoque l'inviolabilit6
de sa personne et son corrollaire qui est celui de refuser son consentement i l'acte
medical susceptible de lui 6 6pargner les cons6quences ultimes appr6hendres.
De 'avis de la cour le principe de l'inviolabiliti de ]a personne n'est pas absolu;
essentiellement il est 6dict6 en vue de la protection meme de la personne et de ia
conservation de son int6grit6 et de sa vie. Le respect de la vie, parce que conforme i
l'int6ret meme de ]a personne bumaine, prime le respect de sa volont6.
Les lois de ce pays renferment des dispositions innombrables toutes orient6es i
prot6ger la vie et la srcurit6 physique de la personne humaine. Elles consid6rent la
vie humaine comme une valeur intangible; elles punissent avec vigeur ceux qui la
suppriment ou y portent atteinte. Si chaque etre humain est, en principe, maitre de
sa destin6e son droit d'autod6termination demeure assujetti aux restrictions prvues i
la loi.
Meme si la tentative de suicide pr6vue i nos lois avant 1972 a depuis 6t6 abroge il
n'en demeure pas moins que quiconque ne saurait, directement ou indirectement,
conseiller, inciter, aider au [sic] encourager une personne i se donner la mort. A
toute personne, au contraire, incombe l'obligation de prot6ger la vie et la srcurit6 de
son semblable, voire selon les circonstances de lui procurer les choses n~cessaires A la
vie. La loi, assurant la protection et ]a promotion du maintien de la vie en tant que
l'on se rende complice de ceux d6sireux de la d6truire.
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has since been repealed, it nevertheless remains the law that no one
is permitted, directly or indirectly, to counsel, procure, aid or abet
anyone to commit suicide. On the contrary, everyone is obliged to
protect the life and security of his fellow man and even, in some
circumstances, to provide him with the necessities of life. The law,
ensuring the protection and promoting the maintenance of life as a
fundamental value, does not permit anyone to become an accom-
plice of those wishing to destroy it.
It is important to emphasize that Barbeau, J.S.C., did not order the hospi-
tal or the doctor in charge of Niemic to perform the treatment necessary,
which was what the Attorney-General's motion was seeking, but only au-
thorized them to do so. The significance of this distinction is that it indicates
that Barbeau, J.S.C., must not have thought that there was any duty on the
hospital or the doctor in charge of Niemic to treat Niemic. While he did not
expressly state this, it is necessarily implicit in the nature of the order he
granted. However, this does not give any indication of whether he was of
the view that the prison officials were under a duty or "merely" had the
power, to treat Niemic without his consent. Even if they were under a duty
to treat, had they not satisfied that duty by attempting to secure medical
treatment for him and by bringing the matter to court?3 Thus, while Bar-
beau, J.S.C., did not refer to Leigh v. Gladstone, once again, the judgment is
one which is at least consistent with that case and which may even be in
accord with its statement that prison officials are under a duty to treat a
prisoner, even without his consent, if such treatment is medically
necessary.
32
Among the authorities upon which Barbeau, J.S.C., did rely,33 however,
was section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms That section
31. Given the seriousness of Niemic's condition, the prison officials, even if they had the
assistance of a cooperative doctor, could not have treated him outside a regular hospital set-
ting. This is unlike a force feeding, which can be done in a prison hospital setting.
32. Leigh v. Gladstone is not restricted to situations in which the prisoner's life is endan-
gered: recall the passage from Lord Alverstone, C.J.'s, ruling.
33. The judgment as reported in the Recueils de Jurisprudence (Cour Sup~rieure) and in
the Canadian Rights Reporter does not include the list entitled "Quotations and Authorities
Consulted" (author's translation; the original French is: "Citations et Autorit6s Consult6es")
which is appended to the judgment as issued by the Court. That list reads as follows: "Art.
19, Code Civil; Loi, Services de Santi & Service sociaux, 1977, c. S-5 a43. (Qu6); Loi, Protection
de la Santipublique, 1977, c. P-35 (Qu6); In re Lodge & al, 1979 (94) D.L.R. (3d) 326; Loi,
Emploi et immigration, 1976 S.C. c. 52; Mayrand, Inviolabiliti de la Personne humaine, 1975
Wilson & Lafleur; Code criminel du Canada, parties IV et VI; In re Enfant Goyette, 1983 C.S.
429; Institut Pinel vs Dion, 1983 CS 438; Regina v. Carter, 1982 (2) C.C.C. (2d) 343 (C. Supr-
ieure); Loi constitutionelle 1982 (Charte des droits, art 7); Skegg, P.D.G., Medical procedures,
1974 (90) LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 512." C.S. Montrial 500-05-003532-841, 1984/03/24.
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provides: 34
7. Everyone has the right to 7. Chacun a droit i la vie,
life, liberty and security of i la liberti et A la sfcurit6 de
the person and the right not sa personne; il ne peut etre
to be deprived thereof except port6 atteinte i ce droit
in accordance with the qu'en conformit6 avec les
principles of fundamental principes de justice
justice. fondamentale.
In my submission, this reference to section seven of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms in the list of authority appended to the judgment in
Niemic may be cause for concern. Was Barbeau, J.S.C., suggesting that sec-
tion seven authorizes the state to compel an individual, in this case, Niemic,
to "enjoy" his "right to life," even if he does not want to? (Niemic clearly
stated that he would rather die in Canada than return alive to Poland.) If
so, 3 5 it is submitted that this application of a Charter guaranteed right is
rather remarkable and completely inappropriate. While there is considera-
ble controversy over the precise meaning and scope of "the right to life,
liberty and security of the person" guaranteed by section seven of the Char-
ter, 31 it is submitted that what law there is interpreting section seven and,
34. Section 57 of the CONSTITUTION AcT, 1982 provides that "[t]he English and French
versions of this Act are equally authoritative." As indicated, supra note 11, the CANADIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS is Part I of the CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982. See also R.
v. MacIntyre, 69 C.C.C. 2d 162 (Alta. Q.B. 1982).
35. Since section seven of the CHARTER is merely included in a list of authorities con-
sulted by Barbeau, J.S.C. and appended to his judgment, it is impossible to know precisely
what use, if any, he made of this provision in his analysis. The result in Niemic suggests the
possibility of an application of the section which is considered in the text of the essay. How-
ever, it is possible that Barbeau, J.S.C. was referring to section 7 as constitutionally reinforcing
the common law right of a patient to informed consent as defined in Hopp v. Lepp and Reibl v.
Hughes This latter possibility, which I submit would be entirely appropriate, may be indi-
cated by Barbeau, J.S.C.'s, reference to Institut Philippe Pinel de Montrial v. Dion. In Dion,
Durand, J.S.C., had stated:
"The backbone of our democratic system is respect for human beings, from both an
intellectual and a physical point of view. We cannot force another person to do
anything without his express or implied consent, with obvious exceptions as provided
in various statutes. This principle, which underlines our whole legal system, both
civil and criminal, was. . . finally enshrined in 1982 in s. 7 of the CANADIAN CHAR-
TER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS." (This is the English translation of the Dominion
Law Reports, at 2 D.L.R. at 236. The original French of the judgment is as follows:
"La cli de voute de notre syst6me d6mocratique est le respect de la personne
humaine, tant dans son aspect intellectuel que physique. On ne peut forcer autrui A
faire quoi que ce soit sans son consentement exprfs ou tacite, sauf 6videmment les
exceptions prfvues par diverses lois. Ce principe, que est sous-jacent i tout notre
syst~me juridique, tant civil que penal, avait . . . 6t6 . . . enfin enchass6 en 1982
dans Particle 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertis " Que. C.S. at 439-440.)
Because of this uncertainty, I must in fairness say "if so."
36. For example, does section seven import property rights into "liberty and security of
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indeed, the other Charter guaranteed rights, proceeds on the implicit as-
sumption that those rights are intended to provide protection to the individ-
ual against the state. In short, section seven should operate as a shield on
the arm of the individual to be used against the state, not as a sword in the
hand of the state to be used against the individual.
CONCLUSION
The leading case of Leigh v. Gladstone holds that prison authorities are
under a duty to impose medical treatment upon a prisoner if the prisoner
withholds consent to necessary medical treatment. In particular, a prisoner
may be force fed to prevent him from starving himself to death. This is an
exception to the general rule that every sane adult person, enjoying the right
to inviolability of his person, has the particular right to withhold consent to
medical treatment.
How, if at all, have the recent judgments in Astaforoff and Niemic affected
the statement of the law given in Leigh v. Gladstone?
First, neither Astaforoff nor Niemic even mentioned Leigh v. Gladstone.
In particular, neither case explicitly overruled Leigh v. Gladstone.
Second, did either case implicitly overrule Leigh v. Gladstone? It is sub-
mitted that they did not. As already indicated, the British Columbia Court
of Appeal in Astaforoff, while not ordering the force feeding of Astaforoff,
explicitly declined to state that prison officials were not under a duty to pro-
vide necessary medical treatment to a prisoner even if against his wishes. In
other words, the Court explicitly declined to overrule the statement of law
set out in Leigh v. Gladstone. Further, the Court was careful to state that
even if prison officials were not under a duty to treat a prisoner against his
wishes, they might have the power to do so. Thus, even absent a duty to
treat, if prison officials went ahead and treated a prisoner against his wishes,
those officials might have a good defence to any criminal or civil proceedings
subsequently initiated by the prisoner. This result would at least be consis-
tent with the result in Leigh v. Gladstone.
In Niemic, the Quebec Superior Court authorized treatment of the pris-
the person"? Do "the principles of fundamental justice" referred to extend beyond procedural
fairness to include examination of the fairness of the substantive law involved in a given case?
On -these questions and others, see, for example, Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor
Vehicle Act, [1983] 4 W.W.R. 756 (B.C.S.C.); Potma v. The Queen, 41 Ont.2d 43 (C.A. 1983);
R. v. Morgentaler, 47 Ont.2d 353(H.C.), affid, 48 Ont.2d 519 (C.A. 1984) and also October 1,
1985, Ontario Court of Appeal, not yet reported; R. v. Robson, 19 C.C.C.3d 137 (B.C.C.A.
1985); Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 14 C.R.R.13, 58 N.R. 1 (S.CC.
1985) per Wilson, J.; Operation Dismantle, Inc. v. The Queen, 13 C.R.R. 287, 59 N.R. I
(s.c.C. 1985).
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oner against his wishes. From the prisoner's perspective, this result is con-
sistent with the result in Leigh v. Gladstone. But what of the reasoning used
to arrive at that result? Is it consistent with the statement of the law in
Leigh v. Gladstone? As already indicated,37 the reasoning of Barbeau, J.S.C.,
may be consistent with that statement of the law. Certainly there is nothing
in his judgment which is necessarily inconsistent with Lord Alverstone,
C.J.'s, ruling.
Thus, it is submitted that neither Astaforoff nor Niemic overrules, either
explicitly or by implication, the ruling in Leigh v. Gladstone that there is a
duty on a prison official to forcibly treat a prisoner who withholds consent to
necessary medical treatment.
In conclusion, then, statements in the textbooks to the effect that
"[p]risoners have the same right to accept or refuse medical treatment as any
other person" 38 may not be an accurate reflection of current Canadian law.
Certainly, it is submitted that this is what the law should be, in order that
prisoners be afforded the same right to inviolability as enjoyed by all other
sane adult persons. As Margaret Somerville has written:39
A prisoner should only lose the exercise of those rights essentially
connected with the fact of imprisonment, such as loss of the right
to freedom of movement, or loss of those r'ights affected by the
necessity to examine the prisoner for contagious disease. Any ad-
ditional interference with the prisoner's physical or mental integ-
rity must be with his fully "informed" consent.
It is submitted that this position is consistent with recent developments in
Canadian prison law generally.' ° Further, section 7 of the Canadian Char-
37. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
38. See PICARD, supra note 3, at 63.
39. M. SOMMERVILLE, CONSENT TO MEDICAL CARE, 95-96 (1979).
40. For example, in Martineau v. Matsque Institution Disciplinary Board, [1980], 1
S.C.R. 602, 625, 635, both Dickson, J. (as he then was) and Pigeon, J., referred with approval
to R. v. Hull Prison Board of Visitors, ex parte St. Germain, [1979] 1 All E.R. 701, 716 (C.A.),
in which Shaw, L.J. had stated, ". . . despite the deprivation of his general liberty, a prisoner
remains invested with residuary rights appertaining to the nature and conduct of his incarcera-
tion. Now the rights of a citizen, however circumscribed by a penal sentence or otherwise,
must always be the concern of the courts unless their jurisdiction is clearly excluded by some
statutory provision. The courts are in general the ultimate custodians of the rights and liber-
ties of the subject whatever his status and however attenuated those rights and liberties may be
as the result of some punitive or other process." As Dickosn, J., stated, at S.C.R. 622: "The
rule of law must run within penitentiary walls." (This is reminiscent of White, J.'s words,
delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 US. at
555-556: "There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this
country.") Admittedly, Martineau was concerned with rights relating directly to the "conduct
of the [prisoner's] incarceration," to use the words of Shaw, L.J., in Hull Prison. But should
that reasoning not apply equally to a prisoner's right to refuse medical treatment? It is submit-
ted that it should.
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ter of Rights and Freedoms4 may well afford a shield to a prisoner resisting
medical treatment without his consent. Unfortunately, as indicated in this
essay, Canadian law on this particular issue is not certain and may be quite
different: the 1909 decision in Leigh v. Gladstone may be law in Canada.
41. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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